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Civic crowdfunding: a new opportunity for local governments 
 
Abstract 
In civic crowdfunding, local communities are asked to financially contribute to projects aimed at the 
regeneration of an area. Usually a local government acts as a co-funder. This paper employs a fuzzy 
set qualitative comparative analysis to discover which conditions are combined and may result in the 
collection of a significant amount of funds. Five conditions were selected: the nature of project, the 
number of backers, the number of rewards, the percentage of backers that did not require a reward 
and the percentage of rewards not required during the fundraising campaign. The study used a sample 
of 40 Italian successful civic crowdfunding rounds sponsored and match-funded by a local 
government. The nature of the projects and the presence of rewards seem to emerge as critical 
influencing factors. These findings open up further investigations on the attitudes of civic backers 
towards rewards and on the charitable nature of civic fundraising. 
 






Local governments and private foundations have traditionally managed the funding of projects aimed 
at territorial and social development by mainly following a top-down approach, which has not 
succeeded in properly engaging citizens and local communities (European Crowdfunding Network, 
2018). In the context of increasing public sector budget constraints, civic crowdfunding has attracted 
increasing interest because of its potential to become both a support mechanism for public finance 
and a way to respond to citizens’ increasing desire for participation in public life (Stiver et al., 2015a). 
Indeed, this type of crowdfunding is defined as civic since it involves citizens, grouped to form local 
communities, which contribute to the regeneration of a territory with their engagement, time, ideas 
and financial resources. Civic crowdfunding needs to be distinguished from other types of 
crowdfunding since it pursues an objective of general interest and mainly concerns place-based 
projects (Charbit & Desmoulins, 2017) through which citizens, mainly in collaboration with the 
public sector, fund projects aimed at public utility. In civic crowdfunding campaigns, public goods 
or services of public interest are backed by individuals, foundations or businesses, with total or partial 
(match-funding) substitution of funding by the public sector. Contributions by these backers are 
completely voluntary and the project is considered successfully financed if an adequate level of 
financing has been collected (Hummel, 2016). Consequently, the relationships that arise between the 
public sector, local communities, social investors and crowdfunding web platforms might be 
considered a collaborative means to achieve important goals in terms of the fulfilment of projects of 
public interest and promotion of local development with a sustainable and inclusive approach. 
Civic crowdfunding has changed the landscape of fundraising for charitable purposes since it is ‘a 
unique type of crowdfunding that garners funds for civic causes, such as urban renewal, 
neighbourhood green space, and community events’ (Brent & Chan, 2019, p. 2143). By analogy with 
studies on other types of crowdfunding models, previous academic research on civic crowdfunding 
has mainly focused on different drivers that can influence the success of civic crowdfunding 
campaigns (see among others, Brent & Lorah, 2019; Doan & Toledano, 2018; Hassna et al., 2018), 
while only less attention has been devoted to the nature of civic project searching for funds (Brent & 
Lorah, 2019; Lee et al., 2019). Notwithstanding, the delimitation and comprehension of this 
phenomenon is far from well-defined. Indeed, civic crowdfunding is a multifaceted phenomenon that 
has not yet received a rigorous examination. Some additional aspects and complexities need to be 
considered, with special reference to the nature of the civic initiatives searching for funds and the 
business model of the crowdfunding platforms involved in civic fundraising campaigns. Civic 
initiatives sponsored and match-funded by local public governments might have both for-profit and 
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not-for-profit natures and their scale may vary considerably. Moreover, civic rounds can be run on 
both generic reward-based platforms and civic dedicated platforms. The business model and 
operational framework of these two different types of platforms is considerably different. Dedicated 
civic crowdfunding platforms charge relatively small fees for their services in comparison to reward-
based platforms, but they ask potential backers for optional gratuities when contributing to a 
campaign (Brent & Chan, 2019). On the other hand, the presence of rewards mut be considered an 
essential component of the investment proposal on reward-based platforms. 
In this context, this paper aims to shed light on the nature of civic projects and on the role played by 
the presence of rewards in these campaigns to investigate the attitudes of backers to such rewards. 
The paper employed a sample of 40 civic crowdfunding rounds sponsored and match-funded by a 
local government and successfully funded on an Italian reward-based platform. 
The study provides new insight into the factors able to influence the fundraising process of civic 
initiatives by investigating the complexity of this market, comprised of both for-profit and not-for-
profit projects, and the role played by the reward mechanism in the engagement of local community. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical framework is 
presented. In Section 3, the key elements of the civic crowdfunding market and the dataset are 
described, and the methodological aspect are explained. Section 4 focuses on the results emerging 
from the analysis, while Section 5 presents a discussion and Section 6 consists of the main 
conclusions, policy implications and research limitations. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Civic crowdfunding is a type of crowdfunding through which local communities, often in 
collaboration with local governments, propose and fund projects that aim to provide local area 
improvement projects or a community service (European Crowdfunding Network, 2018). 
Civic crowdfunding campaigns are a type of fundraising in which, directly or indirectly, the project 
searching for funds benefits from government funds or sponsorship (Bernardino & Santos, 2016). 
Usually, civic crowdfunding involves a fundraising method of total or partial (match-funding) 
substitution of funding by the public sector. As far as Europe is concerned, many local authorities 
(cities and regions) have experimented with different roles within the civic crowdfunding scheme, 
ranging from simple sponsors to co-funders (European Crowdfunding Network, 2018). Thus, civic 
crowdfunding can be seen as both an alternative tool for supporting public finance and a new way of 
interacting between citizens, the public sector and crowdfunding web platforms (Miglietta et al., 
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2013). The potential of civic crowdfunding for boosting economic outcomes and realising a more 
democratic, transparent and efficient allocation of financial resources has been widely highlighted 
(Passeri, 2017). Great potential has also been acknowledged for civic crowdfunding as far as non-
financial benefits are concerned, such as facilitating networking and encouraging collaboration 
between citizens and the government (Stiver et al., 2015b). 
In spite of the considerable flexibility allowed by match-funding schemes in the crowdfunding 
market, starting from the framework proposed by Davies (2014) and then by Charbit and Desmoulin 
(2017), four different approaches to public sector involvement have been proposed: the sponsor 
model, the manager model, the curator model and the facilitator model. In the sponsor model, the 
local public administration runs its own campaign via an existing civic crowdfunding platform. In the 
manager model, the local public administration creates its own crowdfunding platform to fund 
projects aimed at fostering the development of its territory. Usually, these platforms are generic 
crowdfunding platforms where both for-profit/entrepreneurial and not-for-profit projects can be 
promoted. In the curator model, the local public administration, using a generic reward crowdfunding 
platform with a special exclusive civic section, selects and proposes initiatives to be funded. Finally, 
in the facilitator model, the local public administration assumes the role of facilitating citizens’ 
initiatives by supplying technical and financial support and co-screening and/or co-designing the 
projects searching for funds. 
According to Lee et al. (2016), if the proponent of the project is a public authority, the crowdfunding 
round is defined as public rather than civic. In public crowdfunding, the public body is not only a 
sponsor and a co-funder of the initiative searching for funds, but also acts as a proponent. It first 
conducts an internal assessment and selection of potential projects to finance through crowdfunding, 
then steps forward as a proponent of the fundraising initiative. 
2.1 Nature of civic crowdfunding projects 
Civic crowdfunding is not considered a substitute for traditional government spending on 
infrastructure since civic crowdfunding rounds are not typically employed to fund large scale projects 
(Brent & Lorah, 2019). The projects collecting funds through civic fundraising must result in an 
improvement in the lives of the community members and represent a ‘shift to a more participatory 
form of urban planning’ (Brent & Lorah, 2019, p. 122). The projects can have a profit or a not-for-
profit nature, since civic crowdfunding is used also by social entrepreneurs to fund their social 
enterprises (Calic & Schevchenko, 2020; Lee et al., 2019). Social entrepreneurs often have limited 
access to traditional capital providers and this problem seems to sharpen ‘when social ventures need 
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capital to invest in commercial activities that generate earned income’ (Calic & Mosakowski, 2016, 
p. 739). 
Pitschner and Pitschner-Finn (2014), in their study on the factors related to the success of social 
crowdfunding campaigns on reward-based platforms, distinguished between for-profit and not-for-
profit projects, and found that non-for-profit projects have a higher probability of success and 
received higher average contributions in comparison with for-profit projects. 
Within the context of prosocial lending, Allison et al. (2015) concluded that backers are positively 
influenced by narratives that describe the projects as an opportunity to help others, and less positively 
by narratives that highlight the project as a business opportunity. 
Despite the awareness that the civic crowdfunding market comprises projects of different nature, little 
attention has been paid to the complexity that this characteristic entails, also in terms of the amount 
of funds requested and raised. Consequently, taking into consideration that in a generic reward-based 
crowdfunding platform both for-profit and not-for-profit projects coexist, it can be supposed that a 
relationship exists between the amount of funds raised and the nature (for-profit versus not-for-profit) 
of the project. In line with this theoretical background, a first proposition is set: 
Proposition 1: The nature of the project (not-for-profit versus for-profit) in a civic 
crowdfunding round has implications for the results of the fundraising campaign in terms of the 
amount of funds raised. 
2.2 Backers and rewards 
Crowdfunding bases its success on the potential to bring together as many backers as possible 
interested in raising funds for a project (Martinez-Climent et al., 2019). A specific interest in a project 
can be driven by geographical and relational closeness. Though this condition of interest is essential 
for any type of crowdfunding (Hui et al., 2014), it seems to be particularly important in the case of 
civic fundraising campaigns because by supporting projects aimed to stimulate the social and cultural 
development of an area civic crowdfunding has its roots in a sense of belonging to a community or 
place, as well as the benefits expected from the project. Josefy et al. (2016) stated that ‘crowdfunding 
communities are first and foremost communities of interest’ (p. 176) and that the interest in the project 
depends on the match between the project’s aim and the cultural values of its target community. 
Civic crowdfunding often involves participation from backers whose aim is to stimulate the social 
and territorial development of geographical areas to which they feel themselves connected. More 
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precisely, backers are of two types: those who fund and enjoy the benefits of a project (individual 
self-interest) and those motivated by a broader interest in financing a good or service despite not 
having the opportunity to enjoy the benefits directly for reasons of geographical location (self and 
others interest) (Stiver et al., 2015b). The decision to support civic initiatives usually involves ‘a 
strong personal interest-driven mechanism based on knowing each other’ (Sedlitzky & Franz, 2019, 
p. 40). Moreover, people living in the same area tend to have similar preferences, often leading to 
less controversy in project choice (Hudik & Chovanculiak, 2018). According to the aforementioned 
arguments, the following proposition is presented: 
Proposition 2: The number of backers involved in a civic crowdfunding round has 
implications for the result of the fundraising campaign in terms of the amount of funds raised. 
Backers involved in civic crowdfunding campaigns usually expect a non-financial or emotional 
reward since they are driven by a sense of engagement and belonging towards local territories (De 
Falco et al., 2015). Intrinsic motivation is usually associated with a donation investment approach, in 
which investors do not expect a tangible or material reward in exchange for their financial 
contribution (Tomczak & Brem, 2013). Backers involved in civic crowdfunding campaigns seem to 
act as donors, who see their return only in form of happiness because their funds are used for 
honourable causes. Indeed, behaviours performed in order to obtain a reward (external motivation) 
are not relevant for donors acting on crowdfunding platforms (Wang et al., 2019). In the context of 
private contributions to public goods, Burtch, Ghose and Wattal (2013) found evidence that altruism 
is a key incentive to foster contributions by potential investors. Backers involved in civic 
crowdfunding campaign are interested in ideas and the core values of the projects being financed 
(Lehner, 2013) and in the positive capital impact of their investment in term of economic, social and 
environmental values (McWade, 2012). Consequently, they expect a certain social impact or simply 
a noble feeling as a reward (Lehner, 2013). If rewards exist, they should have a symbolic value that 
is lower than the donation amount (Sedlitzky & Franz, 2019). Brent and Chan (2019) analysed the 
‘crowding out’ phenomenon in civic markets. They demonstrated the presence of this phenomenon 
in charitable initiatives since they found a strong negative relationship between donations to the civic 
crowdfunding platform and individual fundraising rounds run on the platform. 
In line with the sense of belonging that is the distinguishing feature of backers in civic campaigns, 
civic crowdfunding campaigns can be run both on dedicated civic platforms and on reward or 
donation- based crowdfunding platforms. To gain an in-depth understanding of the attitude of civic 
backers towards rewards, academic research on factors able to influence the successful conclusion of 
a civic round must be taken into consideration. Different types of factors have been analysed. 
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The influence of lead donors on the performance of civic fundraising campaign was studied by Hassna 
et al. (2018), who focused on the impact that the presence of these donors can have on subsequent 
fundraising, and also investigated as how this influence varies depending on the lead donors’ 
organisation type (business, public sector or NGO) (Zhao et al., 2020). They found that attracting 
lead donations from established organisations, especially NGOs, is a factor that influences the success 
of campaign fundraising. 
Analysing the January–February 2016 Awaroa/Abel Tasman beach campaign in New Zealand, Doan 
and Toledano (2018) reached interesting conclusions regarding the factors needed for the success of 
civic crowdfunding campaigns. Their findings highlighted the factors that are key to a successful 
crowdfunding campaign: ‘high consensus on a community cause based on shared values and concerns 
among members; positive and inclusive discourse running consistently throughout the campaign; 
utilisation of social media channels and features, amplified by support from traditional media to 
maintain campaign momentum; close collaboration between campaign organisers and civic 
crowdfunding platform’ (p. 43). 
Brent and Lorah (2019) found that while the project’s neighbourhood features are not strong drivers 
of total donations for civic initiatives, distance plays an important role. They also concluded that the 
backers’ social networks are critical for backers ‘that live far away from the project site but have 
strong ties to the projects’ community and/or campaign leader’ (p. 129). 
Lee et al. (2019) explored how linguistic style and message substance influence persuasion in civic 
crowdfunding. They concluded that extensive use of social language does not influence funding 
performance; indeed, such language reduces the likelihood of project success. Moreover, they also 
claimed that the funding outcome is influenced by risk language. 
By studying a successful civic crowdfunding campaign in an Italian university, Colasanti et al. (2018) 
found that key factors for success include effective communication and the presence of feelings of 
belonging to the project/initiative searching for funds. Because of the intrinsic motivations that push 
citizens to financially support a civic campaign, they explored the interest of potential backers in 
receiving a reward. It is particularly relevant to underline how the great majority of the respondents 
to their questionnaire claimed they did not need a reward. The inclusion of gifts might also be a 
strategy for collecting more money. Falk (2004) investigated the relevance of gift exchange for 
charitable donations and observed that including gifts has a strong and systematic influence on the 
frequency of contributions. 
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Sedlitzky and Franz (2019) claimed that if a campaign is mainly supported by local communities, the 
interest in a reward might be critical. Indeed, motivation to support a campaign tends to differ between 
backers who lives near the place where the initiative will be implemented and backers who live far 
away from it; direct and personal rewards that arise from the implementation of projects decrease as 
distance increases. Davies (2015) provides a very interesting interpretation of the role played by 
rewards in civic crowdfunding. He claimed that offering rewards at particular levels ‘undermines the 
notion that crowdfunding is a process that anticipates equal participation by all, and incentivises 
backers to contribute different amounts’ (p. 346). 
On the other hand, on reward-based crowdfunding platforms it is possible that some investors back a 
project because of the rewards offered. A project with a large number of rewards is likely to raise 
more funds since it attracts a broader potential community by offering a wider choice of rewards 
(Calic & Mosakowski, 2016). 
In line with the theoretical background on the factors influencing civic crowdfunding, and considering 
that a campaign can be run on a generic reward-based platform, as in the case study selected, the 
following propositions are defined: 
Proposition 3: The number of rewards offered has implications for the result of the 
fundraising campaign in terms of the amount of funds raised. 
Proposition 4: The percentage of backers that do not require a reward has implications for 
the result of the fundraising campaign in terms of the amount of funds raised. 
Proposition 5: The percentage of rewards not required by backers has implications for the result 
of the fundraising campaign in terms of the amount of funds raised. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data 
Usually, small-scale projects (in comparison with local public government capital budgets) are funded 
through civic crowdfunding, including ‘improvements to local parks; installations of green 
infrastructure and community gardens; streetscape enhancements such as crosswalks and bike lanes; 
and public art … volunteer cleanup days; youth after-school programs; and street festivals’ (Brent & 
Lorah 2019, p. 122). It is not possible to define a unique and standardised list of projects since there 
is a wide spectrum of potential initiatives. 
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In the European context, combined funding has usually been awarded to projects in the areas of social 
inclusion, the environment, cultural and creative industries, and also entrepreneurship, agriculture 
and health research (European Crowdfunding Network, 2018). 
Taking into consideration the presence of match-funding schemes, in Italy during 2018, civic-based 
projects collected about 4 million euro (Bacigalupi, 2019; STARTEED, 2019). It is important to note 
that among the Italian cities that invested in crowdfunding, most of the fundraising campaigns were 
directly promoted by the city administration; in a small number of cases, the local public 
administration acted as a project partner. Moreover, in some cases, recourse to crowdfunding 
campaigns is a part of a wider public programme aimed at the promotion of a ‘Smart City’ and 
innovation within a certain geographical area (STARTEED, 2019). Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the majority of local public administrations involved in crowdfunding initiatives are cities, both 
large and small; in one case, a region was the registered partner. 
In this context, the dataset used in this research comprises 40 civic projects successfully funded on 
an Italian reward platform (Eppela) from 2016 to 2019. All these civic initiatives were aimed at 
developing goods or services of public utility and were sponsored and match-funded by a local public 
government. These local governments were mainly cities of varying sizes, but also included one 
region. 
With regard to the nature of the projects, the dataset is largely comprised of not-for-profit initiatives 
searching for funds. Not-for-profit initiatives accounted for 75% of the sample, and for-profit projects 
25%. The average target amount was about 51,000 euros, with a minimum and a maximum amount 
of 6,000 and 150,000 euros, respectively. Except for one case, the campaigns were not overfunded, 
meaning that the funding round was successful, but raised no more than the amount requested; even 
for the single overfunded case, the percentage of overfunding was low (1.05%). The average number 
of backers per project was 73, with a minimum and a maximum of 37 and 235, respectively. 
3.2 Method: fsQCA 
3.2.1 Outcome, causal conditions and calibration 
A fsQCA approach was adopted to draw a map of contingency factors that may influence the 
fundraising results of civic crowdfunding campaigns in terms of amount of funds raised. The 
contribution of this research is therefore not only its content, but also its methodology. FsQCA allows 
the discovery of different paths that lead to the same outcome, in contrast to a unique solution 
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presented by traditional quantitative methods such as structural equation analysis (Huarng et al., 2020; 
Lv et al., 2020). 
In QCA, necessary and sufficient conditions are distinguished in recognition of the fact that different 
sets of conditions may lead to the same outcome (Ragin, 2008). Indeed, QCA is a method of empirical 
analysis that assumes that multiple and different causal paths to a desired outcome may coexist and 
be relevant to explain the outcome in a different way (Fiss, 2007). Moreover, QCA is a suitable 
method for dealing with small datasets, as is the case of the dataset employed in this study (Rihoux 
& Ragin, 2009; Schneider & Wagemann, 2006). 
Different phases are present in the fsQCA methodology: i) identification and calibration of the 
outcome and the conditions; ii) identification and analysis of the necessary conditions; iii) definition 
of a truth table that lists all possible logical combinations that lead to the presence or the absence of 
the outcome, along with the cases related to these; and iv) identification and analysis of the sufficient 
conditions. 
To perform the analysis, first, the outcome must be defined. In this case, the outcome represents the 
amount of funds raised; the presence of the outcome means that a substantial sum of funds was raised, 
while the absence of the outcome means that a low amount of funds was raised. Since the sample 
comprises almost solely campaigns successfully closed and not overfunded, the outcome can be also 
considered a measure of the scale dimension of the project. 
In addition to the outcome, the conditions able to influence the result of the campaign must be 
selected. According to the theoretical framework described above, five antecedent conditions were 
set: nature of project (NP), number of backers (BACK), number of rewards (REW), percentage of 
backers that did not require a reward (BACKNOREW), and percentage of rewards not required/used 
during the fundraising campaign (REWNOUSED). Table 1 provides a description and codification 
of the outcome and the conditions. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Except for the condition NP, which is a crisp condition (0 or 1), all other conditions and the outcome 
must be calibrated. In the calibration process, the raw data are rescaled into scores ranging from 1 to 
0 (Ragin, 2008), identifying the cases of full membership and full non-membership. Usually, 
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calibration criteria are based on theory and the structure of the dataset. However, when there is a lack 
of previous research on the topic, empirical calibration is recommended and the data are calibrated 
using percentile splits of the sample (Crilly, 2010; Lewellyn & Fainshimdt, 2017). 
The outcome (the amount of funds collected during the fundraising campaign) is a continuous 
variable that must be calibrated. To do this, the 10th and the 90th percentiles were used as thresholds 
for full non-membership and full membership, respectively, while the median value was used as the 
crossover point. Table 2 shows the thresholds used for the process of calibration. 
A similar process is adopted for the calibration of the condition BACK and REW. The condition NP 
is crisp and does not need to be calibrated: type of project is coded 1 if it is not-for-profit and 0 if it 
is for-profit. 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
The conditions BACKNOREW and REWNOUSED are percentage values that hence already range 
from 0 to 1, and do not require calibration. 
4. Results 
With fsQCA, it is possible to identify how conditions combine and causally lead to the outcome (i.e., 
the presence of a high level of collected funds) and to the absence of the outcome (i.e., the presence 
of a low level of collected funds). Consequently, two models can be specified as follows: 
Model A: OUT = f (NP, BACK, REW, BACKNOREW, REWNOUSED) 
Model B: ~OUT = f (NP, BACK, REW, BACKNOREW, REWNOUSED) 
where the symbol (~) indicates the absence of an outcome or condition. 
4.1. Analysis of necessary conditions  
The first step of a fsQCA consists of the analysis of the necessary conditions—the conditions that 
must occur to obtain the outcome or the absence of the outcome. Table 3 shows the results of this 
analysis. According to Schneider and Wagemann (2012), to consider a condition necessary, 
consistency must be higher than 0.9. 
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<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
For the first model (i.e., high amount of funds raised), no necessary condition exists; indeed, no 
condition has a consistency score higher than 0.9. For the second model (i.e., low amount of funds 
raised), one necessary condition exists (~REWNOUSED). This means that to raise only a low level 
of funds, the majority of the reward must be required by backers. 
4.2. Analysis of sufficient conditions 
After considering the necessary conditions, the next step in fsQCA is the analysis of sufficient 
conditions. Within this analysis, a truth table is constructed to identify all possible logical 
combinations of causal conditions that can lead to the outcome (or to the absence of the outcome). In 
total, there are 32 (25, where 5 is the number of causal conditions used in the analysis) possible logical 
combinations (rows of the truth table). The truth table lists all possible logical combinations of causal 
conditions, along with the cases conforming to each combination. If rows have no cases, they are 
termed logical reminders and excluded from the analysis. To perform the analysis, a consistency cut-
off must be set; here, consistency cut-offs of 0.811 and 0.758 have been adopted for the presence and 
the absence of the outcome, respectively. 
Table 4 shows the intermediate solution of the fsQCA standard analysis. Three possible solutions 
exist: complex, parsimonious and intermediate. In Table 4, both the models for the presence and the 
absence of the outcome are presented. According to Schneider and Wagemann (2010), the solution 
consistency must be higher than 0.75. Consequently, only the model for the absence of the outcome 
is deemed satisfactory, with a solution consistency of 0.778. The solution coverage for the model 
regarding the absence of the outcome is high (0.789). This index explains the extent to which the four 
configurations of the model explain the data. 
Table 4 also shows the configuration consistency, the raw consistency and the unique consistency. 
Configuration consistency measures the degree to which the configurations are subsets of the 
outcome, raw coverage measures the degree to which the configurations account for the outcome, 
and unique coverage explains the proportion of membership in the outcome explained solely by each 
individual configuration.  
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<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Although the first model (a high level of funds raised) is not satisfactory according to Schneider and 
Wagemann’s (2010) criteria, it is relevant to underline that all the combinations have a consistency 
higher than 0.75, as required by Rihoux and Ragin (2009). Moreover, all combinations exhibit a high 
coverage, mainly Configuration 1 (with a raw coverage of 0.53). Nevertheless, all the configurations 
belonging to this first model are excluded from the analysis because of the solution consistency result. 
On the other hand, for the second model (a low amount of funds raised), four combinations exhibit a 
good consistency level (higher than 0.75) and three of these also have a high coverage ratio. 
Consequently, only Combinations 4–6 are taken into consideration. 
Both the conditions NP and REWNOUSED are present in all three combinations; the conditions REW 
and BACKNOREW are present in two of three paths. 
According to Configuration 4, which represents 27.7% of cases, a low level of funds is raised when 
the project searching for funds is a for-profit project, few backers do not ask for a reward and the 
percentage of reward not required during the campaign is low. 
According to Configuration 5, 28.6 % of cases leading to a low amount of funds raised occur when 
the project is a not-for-profit project, few rewards are offered, many of the backers do not ask for a 
reward and, finally, the percentage of reward not required during the campaign is low. 
According to Configuration 6, 36% of the cases leading to a low amount of funds raised occur when 
the project is a not-for-profit project, many backers take part in the round, many rewards are offered, 
and the percentage of reward not required during the campaign is low. 
The absence of the condition BACKNOREW, which is also a necessary condition for raising a low 
amount of funds, is a critical element in the three combinations described. 
5. Discussion 
To perform an analysis of the potential for collaboration between the public sector, local 
communities, social investors and crowdfunding web platforms, a critical step is understanding the 
nature of the factors able to influence the collection of funds for civic projects. This study contributes 
to this topic by employing fsQCA to identify which conditions combine and lead to the achievement 
of a significant collection of funds for civic projects. The analysis has focused mainly on the nature 
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of civic projects and on the role played by the presence of rewards in the campaign to investigate the 
attitude of backers towards rewards. 
Since they are aimed at improving community wellbeing, civic projects searching for funds are 
usually regarded as charitable initiatives (Sedlitzky & Franz, 2019; Wang et al., 2019). Nonetheless, 
two other aspects must be taken into consideration. First, civic projects have both a not-for-profit and 
a for-profit nature, since civic crowdfunding is also used by social entrepreneurs to fund their social 
enterprises; moreover, civic fundraising campaigns are often run on generic reward-based platforms, 
where rewards are normally provided. 
In this context, and considering the theoretical background described above, five propositions were 
formulated. The first proposition, which postulated that ‘The nature of the project (not-for-profit 
versus for-profit) in a civic crowdfunding round has implications for the result of the fundraising 
campaign in terms of the amount of funds raised’, is supported by the results. Indeed, the nature of 
the project is a condition present in all configurations for the second model (absence of the outcome). 
Nevertheless, a conclusion on the direction of this impact cannot be univocal. In two out of three 
configurations, being a not-for-profit project represents a condition for collecting a smaller amount 
of funds. Since all the projects in the dataset were successful and not overfunded, these results also 
confirm the fact that not-for-profit initiatives need less funds in comparison with for-profit projects. 
On the other hand, in one configuration, the for-profit nature of a project is a condition that leads to 
a smaller collection of funds. These results do not concur with the studies of Pitschner and Pitschner-
Finn (2014) and Allison et al. (2015), who found that non-profit projects have a higher probability of 
success and receive higher average contributions compared to for-profit projects. It should also be 
noted that this study considers the nature of the project a critical condition, since previous academic 
research on civic crowdfunding had not given much to this (Lee et al., 2019; Brent & Lorah 2019), 
focusing on the study of other drivers that can influence campaign success (among others, Brent & 
Lorah, 2019; Doan & Toledano, 2018; Hassna et al., 2018). 
For the second proposition (focused on the number of backers involved in a civic crowdfunding 
project), the results show that the number of backers does not have a significant influence on obtaining 
the outcome; that is, it does not influence the level of funds raised. However, this condition is present 
in one of the configurations indicating that a large numbers of backers in a round results in a low level 
of funds being raised. This finding contradicts the work of Martinez-Climent et al. (2019), who 
propose that crowdfunding bases its success on the potential to bring together as many backers as 
possible interested in raising funds for a project. On the other hand, in the context of civic 
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crowdfunding, the concept of ‘crowd’ is difficult to define ‘since both the number of participants and 
the amount they donate can vary significantly’ (Sedlitzky & Franz, 2019, p. 36). 
Regarding the third proposition (focused on the number of rewards), the results show that this 
condition is also not relevant to the level of funds raised. This condition is present in two of the 
configurations. One indicates that when few rewards are offered, a low level of funds is collected, 
while the other indicates the opposite; when many rewards are offered the level of funds obtained is 
low. 
As far as the fourth proposition is concerned, the percentage of backers requiring no reward is also 
present in two of the configurations. However, similarly to the previous condition, it appears that 
these configurations are in opposite directions. Therefore, the results indicate that this condition is 
not relevant for obtaining funds. Other authors have previously stated that backers involved in civic 
crowdfunding campaigns generally expect non-financial or emotional rewards, as they are driven by 
a sense of commitment and belonging to local territories (De Falco et al., 2015; Lehner, 2013; 
McWade, 2012) 
Finally, with respect to the fifth proposition, the results show that a low percentage of rewards not 
being used is a critical condition for all three configurations that lead to small amounts of funds being 
raised. Consequently, for small-sized civic fundraising rounds, the presence of a reward is a critical 
factor. This result is in contrast with the conclusion reached by Colasanti et al. (2018), in which the 
great majority of respondents to their questionnaire claimed they did not need a reward. Moreover, 
according to Configuration 4, which accounts for 27.7% of the cases, small for-profit civic 
fundraising rounds also tend to find a low percentage of backers that do not require a reward as a 
critical element. Backers of civic fundraising rounds seem to be interested in rewards; they ask for 
them, even though their choice seem not to be affected by the number of rewards (third proposition). 
These results are in line with Sedlitzky and Franz’s (2019) conclusion that if a campaign is mainly 
supported by local communities, interest in rewards can be critical. Indeed, these authors have 
claimed that participation in a civic round is made with a high degree of awareness and ‘this 
awareness primarily involves personal interest, with philanthropy playing a smaller role’ (p. 38). 
6. Conclusion 
This work has focused on the factors that can explain the amount of funds raised in a civic campaign, 
to extend the existing knowledge of the mechanisms guaranteeing a collaborative approach between 
local governments, local communities and crowdfunding platforms. 
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To do this, a fsQCA approach was adopted to study five factors that can impact the fundraising 
process for civic initiatives. The dataset used in this research comprises 40 successful civic projects 
funded on an Italian reward platform (Eppela) from 2016 to 2019. The results show that of the five 
factors studied, only two had an impact on the level of funds collected: the nature of the project and 
the percentage of non-required rewards. 
With regard to the nature of the project, the results of this study identified the nature of the project 
(for-profit and not-for-profit) as relevant to the amount of funds raised, and suggest that not-for-profit 
initiatives need less funds in comparison with for-profit projects. This is in contrast to previous studies 
(Allison et al., 2015; Pitschner & Pitschner-Finn, 2014), which have indicated that non-profit projects 
are more likely to be successful and to raise more funds. On the other hand, the present study has 
shown that that for small-sized civic crowdfunding rounds, rewards seem to play an important role. 
These results are in line with Sedlitzky and Franz’s (2019) conclusion that if a campaign is supported 
primarily by local communities, interest in rewards is critical. 
From a theoretical point of view, this study provides a comprehensive overview of civic 
crowdfunding, which has received less attention from academia compared to other types of 
crowdfunding. The results of the study highlight the complexity of the civic market, comprised of 
not-for-profit and for-profit initiatives, backed by people that cannot be considered pure donors. 
Moreover, the research employs an alternative methodology able to provide evidence of several 
different paths that leads to the same outcome, instead of the unique solution that is typically found 
in traditional quantitative approaches. The fsQCA approach adopted in this study is consistent with 
the complexity and the multifaceted nature of the civic market. 
The most important implication of the study concerns the role played by rewards in civic rounds. 
Exploiting the potential for collaboration between the public sector, crowdfunding platforms and local 
communities implies an awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of a generic reward-based 
platform compared with a dedicated civic platform. In addition, it also implies the need to carefully 
consider the reward mechanism, including the number and the type of rewards used in civic 
fundraising rounds. Consequently, important managerial implications can be derived from this study 
for local governments to improve match-funding schemes, transparency, and bottom-up approaches 
to decision-making processes; for local communities to identify how to support critical projects; and 
for crowdfunding platforms to adopt viable and effective business models for managing civic 
fundraising rounds. 
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It is important to also highlight the limitations of this research, which may serve as a starting point 
for further research. The dataset is comprised of projects drawn from a reward-based crowdfunding 
platform. Similar data from a dedicated civic crowdfunding platform are required to conduct a more 
in-depth analysis of the factors influencing civic fundraising rounds. Moreover, the dataset includes 
only successful projects. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn on the factors for success; this 
would also require data on unsuccessful civic crowdfunding rounds. 
As far as the conclusion on rewards is concerned, it is important to remember that only the number 
of rewards have been considered in this analysis. Further research should focus on the nature of 
rewards by exploring how material or immaterial/emotional rewards might influence the result of a 
campaign differently. 
Dealing with the motivations of civic backers is outside the purpose of this research, but the findings 
show how the idea of assimilating civic crowdfunding with charitable mechanisms cannot be taken 
for granted. The results suggest the need for a more detailed investigation on the motivations of civic 
backers. Civic backers do not appear to act as pure donors, and the role played by rewards in 
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Table 1: Outcome and conditions: Description and codification 
Outcome and 
Conditions Description Codification 
OUT Continuous variable that specifies the amount of funds raised Fuzzy value 
NP Dichotomous variable that distinguishes between for-profit and not-for-profit projects Crisp value 
BACK Continuous variable that specifies the number of backers Fuzzy value 
REW Continuous variable that specifies the number of rewards Fuzzy value 
BACKNOREW Continuous variable that specifies the percentage of backers that do not require a reward Fuzzy value 
REWNOUSED Continuous variable that specifies the percentage of rewards not required by backers  Fuzzy value 
 
Table 2: Thresholds for the calibration process 





OUT 127,485 40,000 9,800 
NP 1 = not-for-profit project; 0 = for-profit project 
BACK 100 61 39 
REW 12 7 6 
 
Table 3: Analysis of necessary conditions 
 Presence Absence 
Conditions Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
NP 0.869589 0.529000 0.649655 0.471000 
~NP 0.130411 0.238000 0.350345 0.762000 
BACK 0.531507 0.503896 0.618391 0.698701 
~BACK 0.682192 0.600000 0.560920 0.587952 
REW 0.647671 0.532432 0.721839 0.707207 
~REW 0.643836 0.660112 0.522759 0.638764 
BACKNOREW 0.487739 0.725363 0.439073 0.778218 
~BACKNOREW 0.850873 0.560015 0.845049 0.662847 
REWNOUSED 0.384524 0.882222 0.256271 0.700730 




Table 4: Analysis of sufficient conditions: The intermediate solution 
 Presence Absence 
Configuration no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
NP l l l ⊗ l l l 
BACK  ⊗    l ⊗ 
REW ⊗ l   ⊗ l l 
BACKNOREW   l ⊗ l  ⊗ 
REWNOUSED ⊗  ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ l 
Raw coverage 0.534 0.387 0.430 0.277 0.286 0.360 0.156 
Unique coverage 0.116 0.086 0.021 0.277 0.089 0.175 0.037 
Consistency 0.778 0.776 0.823 0.838 0.789 0.760 0.773 
Solution coverage 0.679 0.789 
Solution consistency  0.720 0.778 
Note: The symbol ‘⊗’ means absence of the condition and ‘l’ means presence of the condition. Blank spaces indicate a 
do not care condition (Fiss, 2011). 
 
 
 
